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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #275-81/1  
22 January 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)


1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. (U)

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 19 January 1981 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. (U)

  
L. Gray Cowan

Attachment  
NFAC #275-81

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED  
when separated from Attachment.



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## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 27

THE HORN OF AFRICA

Community analysts agreed that the Ethiopians are consolidating their position in the Ogaden now that the fighting, except for the small-scale activities of the anti-Ethiopian WSLF, has died down. All expect Addis Ababa to maintain military pressure on the Siad government by supporting raids of the Ethiopian-backed Somali Salvation Front into Somalia, occasional bombing attacks by Ethiopian aircraft and limited action by Ethiopian forces along the Somali border. There is general agreement that a large-scale invasion of Somalia is unlikely at the present time as some reports have suggested, and that the kind of Ethiopian military activity noted above probably will continue for the near future at comparatively little cost to Addis Ababa.

Most analysts do not believe that the recent reports of discontent within the Ethiopian military represent a serious threat to Mengistu's position. It has been a month or more since these reports first surfaced, and it appears that the complaints registered with Mengistu by some military delegations were centered on "bread and butter" issues within the armed forces and were not intended as a threat to Mengistu's position.

In Somalia, Siad's position continues to be weakened by the withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden. Analysts felt that Somali expectations of US military assistance were enhanced by Dr. Kissinger's visit and that this has allowed Siad to buy time and fend off any potential opposition to him while he awaits a US response concerning military assistance.

CHAD

The consensus among Chad watchers is that the defeat of Habre represents little more than a pause in the recent violent history of that troubled country and that further hostilities are likely. None see the Libyans departing soon, given President Goukouni's almost total dependence on them. Vice President Kamougue will be increasingly a pivotal figure. If, because of his dislike of the Libyans, he should decide to cooperate with former defense minister Habre--now soliciting foreign support from outside Chad--to oust the Libyans, a new round of fighting will result. Habre is still

\* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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seen as an able leader and is expected to exact a heavy toll on the over-extended Libyan forces once he is able to reenter the country with rearmed and reorganized forces. African efforts to exert pressure for a Libyan withdrawal were not given much hope of success. The French position remains unclear; intervention is unlikely absent a request from the recognized head of state, Goukouni, in Chad who has already asked the Libyans to assist him. Analysts felt, however, that the French would make every effort to reassure their African friends, by reinforcing French troops in central African countries, that they would protect their clients from possible Libyan moves. Should the Libyans move toward southern Chad, this might be sufficient provocation for the French to act.

NAMIBIA

The South Africans do not seem to be particularly upset by the failure of the Geneva Conference and appear to expect that some type of limited sanctions will follow. The role of the UN as an honest broker seems to be at an end, and most analysts are waiting to see if some kind of new Western initiative, without the UN, develops. It remains to be seen how serious the Frontline states and other African governments are concerning sanctions, since a number of southern African states are highly vulnerable to South African countermeasures if sanctions are applied. We do expect the Africans to take initiatives toward sanctions in the UN, one of the only ways they can collectively attack the Namibian problem.

US reactions to the failure at Geneva will be watched closely by Africa. Our bilateral relations with some African states, particularly Nigeria, could suffer if we are viewed as not moving vigorously to support the movement in the UN for sanctions. Analysts expect that the South Africans will continue to operate aggressively against SWAPO inside Angola.

MADAGASCAR

Analysts are monitoring closely the Soviet effort to expand and improve Andrakok airfield, adjacent to Diego Suarez, for the Malagasy government. There is some concern that the Soviets may pressure the government for access to the airfield for themselves at some time in the future.

BOTSWANA

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ZAIRE

The internal political and economic situation in Zaire remains fragile. Mobutu appears to be on top of his problems, but continuous reports of discontent in the military raise questions regarding his survivability.

All portions of this report  
are classified SECRET.

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
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
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